Spotting the 2018 R9X Libya Strike - Reconstructing the Data Analysis & Research Process in Hindsight
originally posted 16 August 2020
OSINT researchers contacted me after I posted about identifying the AGM-114 R9X Hellfire missile strike in Libya on 28 August 2018.1 As the Wall Street Journal‘s2 Lubold and Strobel first published on 9 May 2019, there were about six R9X strikes before May 2019. The Libyan case was one of them. This leaves at least two cases as not yet identified. Some OSINT researchers told me they continue to search for the remaining cases, while others said they stopped after their efforts proved futile. I was asked how and what I did in order to identify the case in Libya. In this piece, I reconstruct my steps in hindsight since I found it in July 2019.
Brief Backstory
It was early June 2019 when I finally read the WSJ’s article. It was first to confirm the existence and use of the R9X missile. The WSJ3 stated the R9X was employed “about half a dozen times” in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, before 9 May 2019. However, out of the about six times in which the missile was used, the article only identified two specific cases: the 26 February 2017 targeted killing of al-Masri in Syria; and the 1 January 2019 targeted killing of al-Badawi in Yemen.
My focus and expertise were, and still are, on Israeli targeted killings, not U.S. ones. Still, I entertained myself with the idea of finding the unidentified strikes. My colleagues, Professor Avery Plaw (zl) and Carlos Colon,4 were tracking U.S. targeted killings, but they told me they weren’t going to search for it because their hands were full. I thought I could invest several hours searching for the cases during the garbage time (very late in the day, when I was less productive – especially in considering these were days I’d wake up around 5:30 and work until 20-21:00 on various projects and tasks, among them, attempting to secure a spot in a Political Science PhD program in one of the American Universities I’ve set my eyes on). Therefore, I decided to dig into their U.S. targeted killings database.
Reconstructing in Hindsight the Data Analysis & Research Process
Clearly, the WSJ’s article noted about six strikes in five countries which occurred before May 2019. It also identified two cases, one in Syria and another in Yemen.
Filter data by Country: I worked under the assumption that about six strikes meant 5-7 cases as well as that no country was named without at least a single R9X strike. I was not able to tell if, and if so which, country had more than one strike. It was thus best to focus on the remaining countries, namely: Iraq, Libya and Somalia. This was important because my colleagues did track US targeted killings in, for example, Yemen. I opted out of going through the many Yemeni records. However, my colleagues did not track US targeted killings in all three remaining countries, so I only had data for Somalia and Libya.
Filter data by Date: As simple as it sounds, I filtered out data after 9 May 2019 (WSJ article publication). As for how far back to go, I perused the WSJ article for hints. Note, for example, “The weapon was under development as early as 2011” (my emphasis) and also “Development and refinement of the weapon drew impetus from Mr. Obama’s policy announcement in May 2013 that set new rules for using lethal force […]” (my emphasis). This suggested there was no reason to go back in time more than early 2011, although likely that May 2013 would have been enough.
The two above steps weren’t sufficient because there were still too many cases to go through for a low priority project. Yet the sources of the WSJ journalists basically hinted that the use of the R9X was especially designed for targeting and hitting vehicles in order to minimize civilian fatalities. Consequently:
Filter data by “Object_Type” variable: I decided to analyze the dataset by the Object_Type variable. I kept the records if the Object_Type variable was equal to “Vehicle”.
Filter data by “Fatalities” variable: I next believed it would be efficient to review the data by paying attention to the number of fatalities. Perhaps it was optimism, or just a late in the day misjudgment when my critical thinking was on low alert, but I chose to filter the data again, keeping only cases of 0-2 fatalities (hoping the U.S. was successful). In hindsight, this might’ve well been a mistake and I should’ve kept 3-5 fatalities (bearing in mind number of people in most vehicles and option of harm to nearby people). I then re-arranged the data by fatalities in ascending order.
* * *
Finally, I began to go through the records case by case. I read the text within the “Incident_Summary” variable, looking for clues and to get my head around each incident. This helped discard and move on from some cases.
However, I mostly had to look into each of the individual sources with which my colleagues processed before synthesizing the main/final record. In other words, a number of sources were processed for each data-record. In there, I quickly inspected archived links which often contained photographs from the scenes of the strikes (if there weren’t any then I’d spend a few minutes searching externally).
Importantly, in the imagery from the strike’s scenes, I looked for telling indicators regarding the type of munition which was used in the targeted killing strike. As the R9X missiles do not have an explosive warhead, but blades, the impacts cause distinct signs. For instance, lack of any burnt parts of vehicles in the absence of explosion, the caved-in top of vehicles (often with unique shape due to the missile’s blades), and so on.
* * *
I began going through the records only around July 2019. I believe it was on the second or third day when I found the Libya strike (spending no more than 2-4 hours). After a few more days, I told my colleagues that I found the Libyan case but not the Somalian one.
Although it was fun and nice-to-have, as academically-minded people the scoop itself was not really valuable for us, particularly as there were not enough cases to compare aspects of operations, such as collateral damage between this new munition and others munitions or methods. So I just stored this discovery and forgot about it.
I saw the rise of R9X missiles usage in June 2020. It reminded me of this scoop/discovery. I was surprised nobody else identified the Libya case (nor the Somalian/Iraqi for that matter) since an entire year has passed. I hence decided to share my finding. That noted, I nonetheless argue the R9X is no silver bullet5 when it comes to minimizing or avoiding altogether civilian casualties. It has yet to prove itself.
https://www.s-rabi.com/2020/12/New-Old-Libya-R9X-Strike-Case-Revealed-US-Ramps-Up-Ninja-Bomb-Targeted-Killings.html
https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-u-s-missile-aims-to-kill-only-terrorists-not-nearby-civilians-11557403411
https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-u-s-missile-aims-to-kill-only-terrorists-not-nearby-civilians-11557403411
https://www.amazon.com/Drone-Debate-Unmanned-Conventional-Battlefields/dp/1442230592
https://medium.com/@shahaf.rabi/no-silver-bullet-r9x-missile-drone-strikes-2962020-61237c5cccbb
https://twitter.com/SHF_Rabi/status/1295356771415076865
original post: https://www.s-rabi.com/2020/12/spotting-the-2018-r9x-libya-strike-reconstructing-the-data-analysis-research-process-in-hindsight.html